Generalizing Empirical Adequacy I: Multiplicity and Approximation by Lutz, Sebastian
Generalizing Empirical Adequacy I:
Multiplicity and Approximation
Sebastian Lutz∗
Preprint: 2014-03-05
Abstract
I provide an explicit formulation of empirical adequacy, the central
concept of constructive empiricism, and point out a number of problems.
Based on one of the inspirations for empirical adequacy, I generalize the
notion of a theory to avoid implausible presumptions about the relation of
theoretical concepts and observations, and generalize empirical adequacy
with the help of approximation sets to allow for lack of knowledge, ap-
proximations, and successive gain of knowledge and precision. As a test
case, I provide an application of these generalizations to a simple interfer-
ence phenomenon.
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1 Introduction
At the core of constructive empiricism lies the concept of empirical adequacy.
For according to van Fraassen (1980, 12, emphasis removed), constructive empiri-
cism is the view that
[s]cience aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and
acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empirically
adequate.
The model theoretic notion of empirical adequacy that van Fraassen uses is very
strict: It does not allow for approximation, nor does it allow for lack of knowl-
edge of the phenomena. What is more, the definition puts enormous restrictions
on the structures of scientific theories (§3.2).
In this article, I suggest a generalization of van Fraassen’s notion of a theory
that alleviates van Fraassen’s unduly restrictive demands (§5.1), and I suggest gen-
eralizations of his notion of empirical adequacy that allow for lack of knowledge
of the phenomena (§5.2), for approximation (§5.3), and for an increase of our
knowledge about the phenomena (§5.4). The basis for these generalizations is
provided by one of the inspirations for van Fraassen’s definition of empirical ad-
equacy, the work by Polish model theoretician Marian Przełe˛cki (§4). To show
the viability of the generalizations, I apply them to the investigation of a simple
interference phenomenon, which I will present first.
2 Measuring an interference phenomenon
In an informal overview, van Fraassen (1980, 12) states that “a theory is empiri-
cally adequate exactly if what it says about the observable things and events in
this world, is true”, where what is observable is described by the theory “T it-
self, and the theories used as auxiliaries in the testing and application of T ” (57).
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Call the observable events ‘phenomena’ and their descriptions ‘appearances’. Van
Fraassen (1980, 19) stresses that the notion of empirical adequacy “will have to
be spelt out very carefully if it is not to bite the dust among hackneyed objec-
tions” and I will spell out van Fraassen’s notion in detail in the next section, but
as a rough guide through my example, the informal notion will do. For one, it
already shows that empirical adequacy is a categorical concept, since what a the-
ory says about the phenomena is either true or not, and so the theory is either
empirically adequate or it is not. As van Fraassen (1991, 12) puts it: “Empirical
adequacy, like truth, admits of no degrees”. This leads to problems when the em-
pirical adequacy of a scientific theory is investigated. As will become clear in the
example, empirical adequacy can describe one important aspect of scientific re-
search, but it is too crude a concept to describe a number of similarly important
aspects.
2.1 Epistemic and approximate appearances
Take an application of the ray theory of light. In the ray theory, light beams
are taken to be rays that propagate according to Fermat’s principle of stationary
time, that is, they take a path whose infinitesimal variation leaves the propaga-
tion time invariant. Additionally, each ray is assigned an intensity as an additive
magnitude. Now assume that two light beams of the same intensity travel in a
homogeneous medium on the same line in opposite directions. According to Fer-
mat’s principle, the line will be straight, and so one can describe the intensity of
the light beams as a function of one spatial Cartesian coordinate x, even though
the beams have non-vanishing thickness. The ray theory further asserts that the
intensities of the two beams will simply add up to some intensity ψray(x) = I
that is constant for all x and at all times, so that the time averaged intensity is
also constant for all x:
ψray(x) = I . (1)
ψraythen describes the phenomenon of two light beams superimposed for some
time (say, at least a few seconds) according to the ray theory of light. For the
purposes of this example, I will assume that the phenomenon is in fact correctly
described by the wave theory of light. Then the beams actually produce an inter-
ference pattern
ψ(x) = 2I cos2
2pix
λ

= I + I cos
4pix
λ

(2)
for the time averaged intensity (cf. Batterman 2002, §6.2).
To measure the brightness of the light beams, one could tilt them ever so
slightly, not enough to lead to significant changes in the calculation above, but
enough so that they illuminate a screen placed parallel and in close enough prox-
imity to their path. This is possible because the beams have non-vanishing thick-
ness. A scientist could visually compare the brightness of the interference pat-
tern at different spatial locations on the screen and thus come up with relative
3
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Figure 1: The pattern of the intensity according to the wave theory (dashed) and the blurred
pattern (solid) when a finite spatial resolution p/λ= 10.25 of the eye is taken into account.
intensity values for the two beams for different spatial locations x. This requires
no special measuring devices, which would need to be described by additional
theories. It does, however, require a theory about the scientist’s eyes, which pro-
vide access to the phenomenon. For the purposes of this example, I will assume
a very simple auxiliary theory according to which the scientist’s eyes perceive
brightness as linearly correlated with intensity and with a finite resolution, and
furthermore have some finite spatial resolution.1
For measurement devices in general, finite resolutions can often be described
by some normalized function b , so that the measurement of ψ will be spatially
blurred to the convolution ψb (x) =
∫∞
−∞ψ(y)b (y − x)dy. Assuming, for ease of
calculation, that b is a rectangular function of width p centered around 0, the
convolution amounts to an averaging over the spatial interval [x− p/2, x+ p/2].
The measurement of ψ then gives the result
ψp (x) =
1
p
∫ x+ p2
x− p2
2I cos2
2piy
λ

dy = I +
Iλ
2pi p
sin
2pi p
λ

cos
4pix
λ

(3)
(figure 1). Assuming a finite resolution q of the intensity as well, the measure-
ment results in a function
ψ
q
p :R−→ ℘R≥0, x 7→ψp (x)− q2 ,ψp (x)+ q2

∩R≥0 (4)
that takes values for spatial locations to ranges of non-negative values for inten-
sity.
1. Note that this auxiliary theory could also be assumed to describe a measurement device.
This assumption would arguably fit better with scientific practice and would not require any mod-
ification of the formalism or the subsequent calculations. However, it would go against the distin-
guished status that constructive empiricism confers upon human perception.
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Now assume the scientist’s eyes have under optimal conditions a spatial res-
olution pmin and an intensity resolution qmin, so that the interference pattern as
it appears to the scientist is described by ψ
qmin
pmin
.2 The interference phenomenon
is an observable event, and the scientist’s description of the relative brightness is
an appearance. The scientist’s measurement report, however, will have to state a
finite set of values, as Suppes (1962) famously pointed out. The measurement of
the intensity pattern ψpmin can thus be taken to result in some finite setnD
x1,ψ
qmin
pmin
(x1)
E
, . . . ,
D
xs ,ψ
qmin
pmin
(xs )
Eo
(5)
of pairs of spatial values xi and intensity ranges ψ
qmin
pmin
(xi ).
Now, the ray theory states that the brightness appears constant in different
spatial locations, ψray = I , so that for any resolution p the blurred intensity is
given by
ψray p (x) =
1
p
∫ xi+ p2
xi− p2
I = I , (6)
which, with the finite intensity resolution q , leads to
ψray
q
p :R−→ ℘R≥0, x 7→I − q2 , I + q2

∩R≥0 (7)
Assuming that the ray theory can be combined with the same simple aux-
iliary theory about the scientist’s eyes as the wave theory, the interference phe-
nomenon according to the ray theory is then described by by ψray
qmin
pmin
= [I −
q/2, I + q/2]. Hence ψray
qmin
pmin
6=ψqminpmin , and many of the data sets (5) reported by
the scientists will contain pairs 〈xi ,Yi 〉 with Yi 6=ψ
qmin
pmin
(xi ). Hence what the ray
theory says about the observable things or events in this world is false, and thus it
is not empirically adequate. As far as empirical adequacy is concerned, this is the
end of the ray theory, and there is nothing else to say. Constructive empiricism
then demands that the ray theory must not be accepted.
But of course there is a lot more to say. For one, it might be that the scientist
checking the empirical adequacy of the ray theory has not performed this specific
experiment, and what ray theory asserts about those experiments that she has
performed (say, measurements of the average intensities of single beams) is true.
In this case, the ray theory is empirically adequate as far as she knows. Second,
even if this specific experiment is performed, the scientist may not be in the right
situation to realize that what the ray theory asserts about the intensity is false. In
sub-optimal circumstances (e. g., when looking at the screen from a distance or at
2. Clearly, these are radically simplifying assumptions about the eye’s physiology, but a more
realistic account would complicate things considerably without leading to philosophical insights
relevant for the following discussion.
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Figure 2: The deviation factor D(x) (solid) enclosed between ±1/(2pix) (dashed).
an angle, or if the laboratory is brightly lit), the spatial and intensity resolutions
of the scientist’s eyes will be lower, and hence p > pmin and q > qmin. An increase
of q simply increases the interval of the intensity values (4). To see the effect of
a variation of p, it is helpful to rewrite the blurred interference pattern (3) as
ψp (x) = I + ID
 p
λ

cos
4pix
λ

(8)
with the deviation factor
D(x) =
sin(2pix)
2pix
. (9)
D and the intensity I determine how far individual values of the measured in-
tensity ψp can maximally deviate from I , the intensity’s spatial average. The
maximal deviation thus depends solely on I and the ratio of the precision of spa-
tial measurement and the wavelength, p/λ. As can be seen from both the graph
of D (figure 2) and the formula (9) for D , the functions 1/(2pix) and −1/(2pix)
enclose D .3
For intensities I and wavelengths λ small enough, as well as spatial resolu-
tions and intensity resolutions low enough (i. e., q and p large enough), it will
be difficult or impossible for the scientist to tell from ψ
q
p that the phenomenon
is described by ψ
qmin
pmin
, not ψray
qmin
pmin
. This is because she only has access to epistemic
appearances (described formally in definition 9), here given by ψ
q
p , which only
restrict which appearances are epistemically possible (definition 11), that is, possi-
ble as far as she knows. As long as her knowledge about the actual appearances
(those under the best conditions) is incomplete, her epistemic appearances do not
uniquely determine what the actual appearances are. In the example, both ψ
qmin
pmin
3. Note that |D(x)| ≤ 1 also for x ∈ 0,1/[2pi], unlike 1/(2pix).
6
Sebastian Lutz Generalizing Empirical Adequacy I—Preprint
and ψray
qmin
pmin
may be epistemically possible. In this case, for her the ray theory of
light is epistemically empirically adequate (definition 10). Clearly, an epistemically
empirically adequate theory does not always turn out to be empirically adequate
as well; if and only if the the scientist can exclude all but one intensity pattern
does she know the actual appearances (described formally by claim 4).
The example also provides a very practical sense in which the ray theory
is approximately empirically adequate (definition 13): Although not empirically
adequate simpliciter, the ray theory is empirically adequate for certain, but not
all appearances and only up to certain resolutions, which leads to approximate
appearances (definition 12). Approximately empirically adequate theories like the
ray theory of light, quantum field theory, and general relativity are clearly useful,
and for this reason, van Fraassen (1989, 366, n. 5) himself suggests, but does not
explicate, the notion of an “approximate embedding”.
2.2 The improvement of epistemic and approximate appearances
The scientist who, on epistemic grounds, accepts the ray theory for now can
of course still doubt its actual empirical adequacy. To assuage or confirm her
doubts, she may over time improve her measurements of the interference phe-
nomenon by, for instance, moving closer to the screen, looking at it at a right an-
gle, training her ability to distinguish between differently bright spots, or simply
by including more measurements in her report. This would lead to a restricted
hierarchy of epistemic appearances (definition 15), where at each level, the epis-
temic appearances describe the phenomena better than the previous epistemic
appearances. As Bueno (1997, 603) puts it, the scientist develops a hierarchy of
appearances “built in such a way that, at each level, there is a gain of informa-
tion regarding the phenomena being modeled”. But such a hierarchy would be
restricted to the phenomena currently under investigation, while in general, the
scientist will also want to increase the number of phenomena she studies. This
would lead to an (unrestricted) hierarchy of epistemic appearances (definition 14).
As a special case, the scientist may develop restricted and unrestricted hierarchies
of approximate appearances (definition 17) in which the appearances are closer
and closer approximated (claim 6). All such hierarchies are best conceived of as
possibly infinite, so that, for example, the epistemic or approximate appearances
can asymptotically approach the appearances as they would be determined under
optimal conditions.4
When moving up in the hierarchy, the information about the phenomena in-
creases, and a theory that is not epistemically empirically adequate at some level
of the hierarchy should not be epistemically empirically adequate at any higher
level of the hierarchy either (claim 5). When focusing on a fixed set of phenom-
ena (i. e., within a restricted hierarchy), one can also establish something of a
converse: If at one point in a hierarchy, a theory is empirically adequate given all
4. I thank Leszek Wron´ski for this point.
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epistemically possible appearances, then it will be epistemically empirically ade-
quate no matter how the hierarchy develops further (claim 7). New phenomena,
of course, may still prove a theory empirically inadequate.
The increase of information about the phenomena in a hierarchy of epis-
temic appearances also allows for a comparative concept of epistemic empirical
adequacy (definition 16). While van Fraassen (1989, 67) provides the compara-
tive notion of one theory being “empirically at least as strong” as another, this
concept serves a different purpose: If a theory T1 is at least as strong as another
theory T2, then T1 is empirically adequate only if T2 is (claim 9), but that says
nothing about the theories’ actual empirical adequacy. Indeed, there is a negative
correlation between between comparative empirical strength and comparative
empirical adequacy: If a theory T1 is empirically at least as strong as another
theory T2, then T2 is at least as epistemically empirically adequate as T1 no mat-
ter the hierarchy (claims 8 and 9). In other words, no matter how the scientist
improves her information about the appearances, a theory that is empirically
at least as strong as another will never be the second to be proven empirically
inadequate.
The concepts introduced so far will be defined precisely in the following,
which will also allow for proofs of the claims of this section. To this end, I
will first spell out the definitions given by van Fraassen (1989) explicitly and
discuss their features. For the new concepts, I will deviate as little as possible
from van Fraassen’s formalism; specifically, I will rely on one of the formalisms
that inspired van Fraassen’s definitions.
3 Empirical adequacy: Definitions, virtues, and prob-
lems
Although van Fraassen (1980) defines empirical adequacy in terms of model the-
ory, his formal exposition is rather light. I will thus rely on the standard nota-
tion as used by Chang and Keisler (1990, §1.3) and, more loosely, by Hodges
(1993, §§1.2–1.3). Hence a structure A is a pair 〈A,I 〉 consisting of a domain A
and a function I from a set of mi -place relation symbols Ri , n j -place function
symbols F j , and constant symbols ck to, respectively, mi -ary relations, n j -ary
functions, and constants on A. Unless stated otherwise, I will in the following
always assume this set of symbols with the same arities. I will sometimes refer to
non-logical symbols as ‘terms’ when this does not lead to ambiguity. Sometimes,
I use indexed structuresMi instead of A,B, etc. Awill always be the domain |A|
of A, B = |B| etc. If A = 〈A,I 〉, I write RAi instead of I (Ri ), and analogously
for functions and constants. RBi is the relation in B that corresponds to relation
RAi in A, and analogous for functions and constants. In displayed form, I write
a structure A as 〈A,RA1 , . . . ,RAs ,F A1 , . . . ,F At , cA1 , . . . , cAu 〉 or, for possibly infinite
index sets, 〈A,RAi ,F Aj , cAk 〉i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K .
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In contradistinction to the above, Bell and Slomson (1974, 73) define a re-
lational structure A as a pair 〈A,{Ri}i<α〉 of a domain and a set of relations,
where α is a cardinal. This difference is little more than notational, since in their
definitions of further model theoretic concepts, the corresponding relations are
determined by the index set {i : i < α}, which therefore plays the role of the
set of relation symbols {Ri : i ∈ I } used by Chang and Keisler (1990, 19–20) and
Hodges (1993, 2). For examples relevant in the following, compare the definitions
of reduct, isomorphism, and substructure by Chang and Keisler (1990, 20–23)
and by Bell and Slomson (1974, 153, 73), respectively.5 The reader who prefers
the notation by Bell and Slomson (1974) will have no problems translating the
following discussion.
3.1 Definitions
Within constructive empiricism, van Fraassen (1980, 64) states,
[t]o present a theory is to specify a family of structures, its models;
and secondly, to specify certain parts of those models (the empirical
substructures) as candidates for the direct representation of observ-
able phenomena.
Furthermore the models of the theory “are describable only up to structural
isomorphism” (van Fraassen 2008, 238; cf. 2002, 22). More formally, this can be
phrased as follows:
Definition 1. A theory

{Tn}n∈N ,{En}n∈N contains a family of struc-
tures (the models of the theory) and for each structure Tn =
D
Tn ,P
Tn
i ,F
Tn
j ,
cTn
k
E
i∈In , j∈Jn ,k∈Kn
a set En of empirical substructures, such that for each E ∈ En ,
E ⊆ Tn . With each model, a theory also contains every isomorphic structure
and its corresponding6 empirical substructures.
As a shorthand, define


Tn ,En

:=

{Tn}n∈N ,{En}n∈N. Van Fraassen (1989,
16) distinguishes strictly between observable and unobservable entities, and fur-
thermore between phenomena and appearances: “Phenomena are observable en-
tities (objects, events, processes,. . . ) of any sort, appearances are the contents of
measurement outcomes” (van Fraassen 2008, 283). In the example with the light
5. For reasons that are not entirely clear, this notational convention has become a philosophical
point of both contention and confusion. Van Fraassen (1989, 366, n. 4), for example, objects to
structures being “yolked to a particular syntax”, where ‘syntax’ seems to stand for ‘set of non-
logical symbols in the object language’ (see n. 15). And French and Ladyman (1999, 115) see support
for van Fraassen’s position in the definition of ‘structure’ given by Hodges (1993), which, however,
assigns a particular set of non-logical symbols to each structure (cf. Lutz 2014b, §3).
6. To be precise: If f : Tm −→ Tn is an isomorphism between Tm and Tn , then the set En of
empirical substructures that corresponds to Em contains all and only those structures E for which
there is an E′ ∈ Em such that f is an isomorphism between E′ and E.
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beams, the screen and individual areas on the screen are observable (they are
objects), and so are the events of their illumination. Indeed, the illumination of
the screen as a whole is an observable event, and hence a phenomenon. That
these objects and events are observable is a fact of human physiology, and thus
observer relative; human perception has a distinguished status in constructive
empiricism (van Fraassen 1980, 57). As is assumed in the use of a convolution
function in the example, the objects’ and events’ observability can be described
by a theory, and typically different theories describe what is observable and how
it is observable in different ways. But since their observability is an empirical, ob-
jective fact, this does not make their observability theory relative (van Fraassen
1989, 57). By contrast, thus van Fraassen (2008, 284),
the appearance is determined jointly by the measurement set-up (in-
volving both apparatus and the system to which it is applied), the
experimental practice, and the theoretical conceptual framework in
which the target and measurement procedure are classified, charac-
terized, and understood.
This is clear in the example of the interference phenomenon: The phenomenon
is described in terms of intensity and spatial position, which occurr in the concep-
tual frameworks of both the ray and the wave theory. The measurement set-up
and the experimental practice (the direction of the light beams, the screen, and
the scientist using her eyes) then determines the appearance in this framework.
According to van Fraassen (1980, 64), appearances can be described by structures
as well: “The structures which can be described in experimental and measure-
ment reports we can call appearances”. This suggests
Definition 2. Appearances are given by a set A of structures. A structure A ∈A
is an appearance.
Note that the set of appearances does not have to be closed under isomor-
phism. The appearances A in definition 2 must be taken as, first, relative to the
group g of persons whose perceptual apparatus is described by the theory T
that is used for determining what is observable, and second, relative to T . For-
mally, however, this would only result in two additional indices (‘Ag ,T ’) that are
constant as long as the same group and the same theory are discussed; hence I
will suppress the indices in the following. But care has to be taken when deal-
ing with two theories (or more) at once: When determining their empirical ad-
equacy, one can use the same phenomena for both theories, but not generally
the same appearances. In the example of the interference phenomenon, the use
of the same appearance is only possible because, first, the same auxiliary theory
was used, and second, the ray theory and the wave theory rely on the same terms
that furthermore have the same extensions in the description of the interference
phenomenon. The terms’ intensions (and their conceptual role) in the respective
theories may still differ, however.7
7. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this analysis.
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Van Fraassen (1980, 64) now defines a theory to be “empirically adequate if it
has some model such that all appearances are isomorphic to empirical substruc-
tures of that model” (cf. van Fraassen 1991, 12):
Definition 3. A theory


Tn ,En

is empirically adequate for appearancesA if and
only if there is some n ∈ N such that for every A ∈ A, there is an E ∈ En with
E∼=A.
Comparing van Fraassen’s technical explication of empirical adequacy with
his informal description shows that the former implicitly contains two further
technical explications. For one, “what [a theory] says about the observable
things” is determined by its empirical substructures, and second, the truth
of those statements is the same as each appearance being isomorphic to one
of those empirical substructures. As simplifying slogans, one could thus say
that restricted aboutness is expressed by the substructure relation and truth is
expressed by isomorphism.
Definition 3 defines the empirical adequacy of a theory relative to a set of
appearances. In contradistinction, empirical adequacy simpliciter is defined as
empirical adequacy for the set of all appearances (cf. Monton and Mohler 2008,
§1.5). And it is for empirical adequacy simpliciter that van Fraassen (1980, 12,
emphasis removed) claims that “acceptance of a theory involves as belief only
that it is empirically adequate”. Definitions 3 can thus already take a certain lack
of knowledge about the appearances into account, since A may not contain all
appearances. Such an incomplete set A of appearances may allow the deductive
inference that some theory is not empirically adequate, but the inference that a
theory is empirically adequate will have to be in some way ampliative.
A note on terminology: Van Fraassen (1980, 66) and others (e. g., Suárez 2005,
§4.1; Monton and Mohler 2008, §§1.5–1.6) occasionally speak of the empirical
adequacy of a theory as the embeddability of the appearances into a model of the
theory. But the two are not equivalent: A ∈A can be embedded in Tn if and only
if A is isomorphic to any substructure of Tn (Hodges 1993, 6). The substructure
does not have to be an empirical substructure.8 In the following, I will call an
isomorphic mapping to an empirical substructure an empirical embedding.
Some exponents of empirical adequacy (e. g. Suárez 2005, 39) rely on a mod-
ified notion of empirical adequacy:
Definition 4. A theory


Tn ,En

is idiosyncratically empirically adequate for ap-
pearances A if and only if for every A ∈ A, there are an n ∈ N and an E ∈ En
such that E∼=A.
8. In contradistinction, Muller (1997, 2) defines an empirical substructure to be any substruc-
ture that is isomorphic to an appearance. He therefore assumes that a theory has no distinguished
empirical substructures independently of the appearances. (As Muller points out, if there is only
one appearance that is relevant for the theory and the theory is empirically adequate according to
Muller’s definition, the theory has exactly one empirical substructure. If there are more appear-
ances, that same theory can have more empirical substructures.)
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Definitions 3 and 4 are equivalent if there is only one appearance, A= {A},9
but not in general (claim 1).10 It is easy to see that if


Tn ,En

is empirically
adequate, then it is idiosyncratically empirically adequate, so that empirical ade-
quacy is strictly stronger than idiosyncratic empirical adequacy.11
Since theories are closed under isomorphism, an appearance is empirically
embeddable in a model of a theory if and only if it is an empirical substruc-
ture of a model of that theory (Hodges 1993, ex. 1.2.4b). Therefore a theory is
idiosyncratically empirically adequate if and only if all appearances are empiri-
cal substructures of models of the theory (that is, in definition 4, E ∼= A could
be exchanged for E = A). This is not the case for empirical adequacy, however
(claim 2).
3.2 Virtues and problems
Empirical adequacy has two important virtues: First, while constructive empiri-
cism crucially relies on empirical adequacy, the reverse is not true. Even a realist
can rely on empirical adequacy as one property of a theory, for example by in-
ferring that some theory is false because it is not empirically adequate. In this
sense, empirical adequacy is metaphysically neutral, but can be used to define an
anti-realist position like constructive empiricism.
Second, while constructive empiricism confers a distinguished status upon
human perception, the formalism describing empirical adequacy does not. It can
therefore be used to describe empirical adequacy even if what counts as an obser-
vation is not determined by the scientist’s eyes but, say, the measurement devices
available to the scientist.12 Thus the formalism that van Fraassen has developed
is to some extent independent of his epistemological positions.
These virtues, however, are countered by a significant shortcoming: A the-
ory is empirical adequate if and only if everything it says about all appearances
is completely true. It is not clear whether there is a single non-trivial scientific
theory that fulfills this requirement, and not clear whether there ever will be.13
9. This is decidedly not what van Fraassen in general assumes (personal email from June 15,
2011), and it is also incompatible with his definitions of appearances and empirical adequacy quoted
above: The “structures” (plural) given by measurements are appearances, and in the case of empiri-
cal adequacy, “all appearances are isomorphic to empirical substructures” (plural) of a single model.
Some philosophers of science, e. g. Przełe˛cki, have claimed (independently of constructive empiri-
cism) that the appearances are plausibly always expressible in a single structure; others, e. g. Sneed
and Wójcicki, have defended the opposite (see Przełe˛cki 1974a, 103, and references therein).
10. If the family {En}n∈N is understood as determined by the appearances (see n. 8) and ‘substruc-
ture’ is taken to mean ‘relativized reduct’ (see §5.1), Muller (1997, 2) also relies on idiosyncratic
empirical adequacy. Thus while his discussion of the relation of wave and matrix mechanics “can
be regarded [ . . . ] as a morsel of applied philosophy of science”, it cannot be regarded an applica-
tion of van Fraassen’s philosophy of science.
11. Since Suárez (2005) argues that van Fraassen’s notion of empirical adequacy is too strong, his
use of idiosyncratic empirical adequacy thus does not threaten his conclusion.
12. See n. 1.
13. The qualifier ‘non-trivial’ is essential: A theory that says next to nothing about anything
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The example of the interference phenomenon has made clear that an analysis
of scientific research needs concepts that apply even if the theory’s statements
are not completely true. These concepts, I suggest, are epistemic and approximate
empirical adequacy. The discussion of van Fraassen’s formal notions has brought
out the need for a concept that applies even if not all appearances have been
taken into account. Such a concept is already given by definition 3, which de-
fines empirical adequacy relative to some possibly incomplete set of appearances.
Van Fraassen’s notion is recovered by demanding empirical adequacy relative to
all appearances. Without these concepts, empirical adequacy is only equipped to
describe a small part of scientific research, namely the final state of measurement
procedures, when all phenomena are described with maximum precision and
without any uncertainties that could be removed by improved measurements.
This state would be completely static, so that empirical adequacy provides no
means of describing the development of the scientific testing of theories. For
this, I suggest hierarchies of epistemic and approximate appearances.
Finally, there should be a concept that applies even if not everything a the-
ory says about observable things is true. Specifically, not all concepts of a theory
should have to be considered. This is especially clear for functions and constants.
For it follows from the definition of a substructure that every constant of a
model Tn has to be in the domain E of each of its substructures E ∈ En . Fur-
thermore, every function of the model E ∈ En must map all (tuples of) elements
of E to elements of E (Hodges 1993, lemma 1.2.2). Thus if, for example, there
is a successor function on the whole domain of the theory, every model Tn has
only itself as a (trivial) substructure. Therefore it can also have at most itself
as empirical substructure. If now a theory


Tn ,En

is empirically adequate, ev-
ery appearance is a substructure of some Tn , so that Tn’s domain Tn contains
measurement results; hence all constants of Tn are directly measurable, and all
functions of Tn map measurement results to other measurement results. It seems
clear that few actual scientific theories meet these restrictions.
One may object to these problems for two reasons. For one, in early works
van Fraassen (1970, §3) relied on “elementary statements” and a “satisfaction func-
tion” to give the relation between a theory and observations, so that one could ar-
gue that the model theoretic formalization above does not capture van Fraassen’s
position. However, van Fraassen (1989, 365, n. 34) himself states that he soon
“found it much more advantageous to concentrate on the propositions express-
ible by elementary statements, rather than on the statements themselves”. Thus
van Fraassen had abandoned the reliance on elementary statements and satisfac-
tion functions by the time he defined empirical adequacy. More importantly, em-
pirical adequacy is defined without reference to either of the two concepts, and
thus an analysis of empirical adequacy does not have to take them into account
is likely to be empirically adequate (Worrall 1984, §3; Percival 2007, 87; Lutz 2014a, §6), but
restricting scientific research to such theories would be cold comfort. Note that empirical adequacy
is still a weaker requirement than truth, which would amount to the existence of an isomorphism
between one of the models of the theory and (the structure of) the world.
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either.
One may also object that the terms ‘embedding’, ‘substructure’, and ‘isomor-
phism’ are not meant literally, but refer to relations between theories and phe-
nomena given by either satisfaction functions or something completely different.
Possible support comes from van Fraassen’s standard example of embedding, the
seven point geometry (1980, §3.1; 1989, §9.1), which is not an embedding in the
sense of model theory (Turney 1990, 441–443). But this looks more like an over-
sight than a conscious decision. Furthermore, the terms are well-defined within,
but not outside of model theory, where they also do not in general occur together.
And the objection makes van Fraassen use these terms in a different, undefined
way without pointing this out. This would be very problematic for van Fraassen’s
overall position of constructive empiricism, as he himself states that the notion
of empirical adequacy must be spelled out carefully in order to avoid hackneyed
criticisms. And so, without a carefully spelled out notion of its core concept,
constructive empiricism may fall prey to the same criticisms.
The objection that van Fraassen does not use model theoretic terminology
with its literal meaning also flies in the face of van Fraassen’s own elaborations.
For instance, van Fraassen (1980, 43–44) states explicitly that in his discussion of
the embedding relationship between models, defined as one model “being isomor-
phic to a part (substructure)” of another, the use of the word ‘model’ “derives
from logic and meta-mathematics”.
The objection furthermore renders nonsensical many of van Fraassen’s ar-
guments. Take, for example, van Fraassen’s position that syntactic accounts of
empirical adequacy and equivalence have failed (§3.6). In a counterargument,
Worrall (1984, 71) points out that “to every normal (‘elementary’) set of models
there corresponds a consistent set of first-order sentences” and argues that for this
and other reasons, semantic approaches are not in principle superior to syntactic
ones. Similarly, Friedman (1982, 276–277) argues that for elementary classes of
models, “the Completeness Theorem immediately yields the equivalence of van
Fraassen’s account and the traditional syntactic account”. Van Fraassen (1989, 211,
n. 31) replies with a result from formal model theory (Bell and Slomson 1974, 141,
lemma 1.13), stating that “when a theory is presented by defining the class of its
models, that class of structures cannot generally be identified with an elementary
class of models of any first-order language”, that is, “the family of models may
not be an elementary class”. Thus van Fraassen counters Worrall and Friedman
by pointing out that their arguments presume that all classes of models of theo-
ries are elementary (can be defined in predicate logic of first order), which, he
states, is not generally the case. But if van Fraassen did not think of models in
terms of formal model theory, he would have to respond that both critics are
missing the point, since the completeness of first order logic (which connects
syntactic descriptions only to structures of formal model theory) would be com-
pletely irrelevant for his claim that models in his sense cannot be described or
analyzed syntactically. And the same would hold for the possibility of describing
classes of structures of formal model theory, whether elementary or not, by first
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order sentences. In short, he would have to respond that Worrall and Friedman
are trading on the ambiguity of ‘model’ when using results from model theory,
but instead uses such results himself.14
Finally, the objection that van Fraassen does not use model theoretic termi-
nology with its literal meaning would leave many of van Fraassen’s claims un-
justified. For example, van Fraassen (1980, 43) discusses cases in which “every
model of T1 can be embedded in (identified with a substructure of) a model of
T2.” The parenthetical equivalence claim relies on the model theoretic definition
of ‘embedding’ and ‘substructure’, on the closure of the set of models of a theory
under isomorphism, and the equivalence of embedding and the substructure rela-
tion for classes of structures that are closed under isomorphism (Hodges 1993, ex.
1.2.4b). If the terms were not meant in the model theoretic sense, there would be
no reason for this equivalence claim. Thus van Fraassen’s conception of empirical
adequacy relies crucially on model theoretic notions and the problems that result
from a literal reading of his model theoretic definitions are indeed problems.15
There is, however, at least one alleged problem of van Fraassen’s notion of
empirical adequacy that poses no difficulty. It is based on Suppes’s point that
measurement results are reported as finite sets of data. Van Fraassen (2008, 166–
172) takes Suppes’s point into account and makes a distinction between surface
models, which for the interference phenomenon is given by ψ
qmin
pmin
, and data mod-
els, the measurement results. He then demands that “the data or surface models
must ideally be isomorphically embeddable in theoretical models” (168). In their
“cardinality objection”, Bueno, French, and Ladyman (2002, 503) argue that such
a demand is problematic because the domains of data structures “in general are
finite”. The implicit assumption of the cardinality objection is that empirical
substructures always have infinite domains, but this is not necessarily so. To fol-
low van Fraassen and allow an empirical embedding of both finite and infinite
appearances, theories only need both finite and infinite empirical substructures.
This is easily achieved, since for any model Tn of a theory, the set of empirical
substructures En can be closed under the substructure relation, that is, if E ∈ En
and E′ ⊆E, then E′ ∈ En , so that with every empirical substructure E, all of E’s
finite substructures are empirical substructures as well. In other words, the car-
dinality objection fails because it assumes a feature of all empirical substructures
(i. e., infinite domains) not entailed by van Fraassen’s position. This response to
14. I do not endorse van Fraassen’s argument. For my point it is only important that the argu-
ment presumes that theories can be described as classes of model theoretic structures. In fact, I
think that van Fraassen’s position is wrong and the exchange between Worrall, Friedman, and van
Fraassen is a red herring, since, first, the paradigmatic syntactic approach of the logical empiricists
explicitly assumes higher order logic (Lutz 2012, §2), and second, empirical adequacy can provably
be expressed in higher order logic (Lutz 2014a).
15. Incidentally, since van Fraassen relies on model theory, his alleged freedom from being
“yolked to a particular syntax” can only amount to the freedom from a particular set of non-
logical constants in the object language as it is found in the definitions by Bell and Slomson (1974).
For even in those definitions, the use of a model theoretic structure always fixes a particular syntax
up to the choice of a set of non-logical constants (cf. Lutz 2014b, §3).
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the cardinality objections is restricted only by the problems stemming from the
technical aspects of substructures discussed above (it is impossible, for instance, if
the theory involves a successor function on its whole domain). Hence a solution
to these problems will also provide a response to the cardinality objection.
This, then, leaves the problems stemming from the use of substructures, the
lack of a notion of epistemic appearances and of approximate appearances, and
the lack of a notion of information gain about the appearances. These problems
can be solved by further developing empirical adequacy, which, it turns out, can
be done by looking at its origins.
4 Approximation sets
Van Fraassen (1980, 64; 1989, 227) traces his notion of empirical substructure
back to a monograph by Przełe˛cki (1969) and other works on the application
of model- and set theory in the philosophy of science, only noting that “some
of these formulations were still more language-oriented than [he] liked” (1989,
227). However, the connection between Przełe˛cki’s monograph and constructive
empiricism is not obvious, to put it mildly: Van Fraassen (1980, §3.6) famously
declared that the (so-called) received view on scientific theories, as developed by
Carnap, Hempel, and others within logical positivism, is in principle unable to
describe the correct relation between theory and phenomena. Przełe˛cki (1975,
284), on the other hand, thought of himself as “positivistically-minded” and of
the monograph as an introduction to the received view (Przełe˛cki 1974b, 402).16
Przełe˛cki’s discussion differs from previous expositions (e. g. Carnap 1939, §24)
mainly in that he explicitly develops the model theoretic implications of the
received view and discusses approximations. It is this latter discussion, and its
elaboration that Przełe˛cki (1976) published after Fine (1975, n. 13) had developed
a similar idea, that provide the relation to constructive empiricism.17
Starting from a discussion of vague terms, Przełe˛cki (1976, 378) suggests treat-
ing approximations with the help of sets of structures. The denotation of a re-
lation symbol Ri that is only approximately determined over some domain A
tripartitions the product domain Ami into a set R+i of definite instances (the pos-
itive extension of Ri ), a set R
−
i of definite non-instances (the negative extension),
and a set of borderline cases of Ri , which I will call R◦ (the neutral extension).
The denotation of a function symbol F j that is approximately determined over
A does not assign a single element b ∈ A to an n j -tuple 〈a1, . . . ,an j 〉 ∈ An j , but
rather a set F +◦j (a1, . . . ,an j ) = B ⊆ A (375).18 B can be seen as the set of possi-
16. It is hence fascinating to see Przełe˛cki’s work cited as a precursor or even an elaboration of
the semantic view (da Costa and French 1990, 249; Volpe 1995, 566), even though the semantic
view, in which van Fraassen’s notion of empirical adequacy is phrased, is usually considered to be
diametrically opposed to the received, or “syntactic”, view.
17. For a more thorough discussion of Przełe˛cki’s formalism, see Lutz (2013).
18. This is a slight generalization of Przełe˛cki’s account, who assumes that B is an interval of
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ble values of the function named by F j for the arguments a1, . . . ,an j , and I will
refer to the set
〈a1, . . . ,an j , b 〉 :a1, . . . ,an j ∈ A, b ∈ F +◦j (a1, . . . ,an j )	 as the non-
negative extension F +◦ of F j .19 Considering constant symbols 0-place function
symbols, this means that the denotation of a constant symbol ck that is approxi-
mate over A is a set c+◦
k
⊆A.
For a function symbol F j , F
+◦
j may contain unintended functions. For ex-
ample, unless F j has a positive extension over the whole domain, F
+◦
j contains
discontinuous functions, which may go against the intended denotation of F j .
Przełe˛cki (1976, 376) therefore allows the denotation of a function symbol F j to
be further determined by a set of “additional conditions” W (F j ). Similarly to
Przełe˛cki’s additional conditions are what Fine (1975, 124) calls “penumbral con-
nections”, sentences that have to be true for all extensions of all terms. However,
Fine assumes that these connections are given in the object language, not in the
meta-language determining the denotations, and he does not restrict the penum-
bral connections to functions only. I will follow Przełe˛cki in assuming that the
penumbral connections are given in the meta-language, but I will follow Fine in
allowing penumbral connections for all terms. Specifically, I will assume that the
penumbral connections determine a penumbral set P of structures.
The denotations of approximate terms over A and the penumbral set P im-
mediately lead to a set of of structures:
Definition 5. Let the terms {Ri ,F j , ck}i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K be approximate over do-
main A with positive, negative, and non-negative extensions {R+i ,R−i ,F +◦j ,
c+◦
k
}i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K , and penumbral set P. Then the terms’ approximation set M for
A contains all and only structures M ∈ P for which
M =A, (10)
R+i ⊆ RMi ⊆Ami −R−i for all i ∈ I , (11)
FMj ⊆ F +◦j for all j ∈ J , and (12)
cMk ∈ c+◦k for all k ∈K . (13)
In the following, I will assume that the approximation set for the terms and
the penumbral set is never empty, that is, the penumbral connections are not
in conflict with the positive, negative, and non-negative extensions of the terms.
Furthermore, I will assume that the penumbral set is only used to exclude those
structures from approximation sets that cannot be excluded with the help of
positive, negative, and non-negative extensions. More precisely, I will assume
that for any approximation set M over domain A for terms with {R+i ,R−i ,F +◦j ,
reals, which would therefore have to be in A.
19. F +◦j is the union of an approximate relation symbol’s positive and neutral extensions.
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c+◦
k
}i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K and P,
R+i =
⋂¦
RMi :M ∈M
©
, (14)
R−i =
⋂¦
Ami+1−RMi :M ∈M
©
, (15)
F +◦j =
⋃n
FMj :M ∈M
o
, and (16)
c+◦
k
=
⋃¦
cMk :M ∈M
©
(17)
for all i ∈ I , j ∈ J ,k ∈K .
An approximation set M represents those structures that approximate the
right structure (or set of structures). The right structure will thus be in M, to-
gether with other structures that are close enough to the right one. Note that
approximation sets are extremely general, so that, formally, not much is assumed
about the nature of approximation. Approximate truth is then truth in a struc-
ture approximating the right structure or set of structures (Przełe˛cki 1976, 378):
Definition 6. LetM be an approximation set. A set of sentences is approximately
true if and only if in at least one M ∈M all its elements are true. A sentence is
approximately true if and only if its singleton set is approximately true.
The definition of approximate truth for sets of sentences avoids inconsistent
approximately true sets. In this way, a finite set of sentences is approximately true
if and only if the conjunction of its elements is approximately true. Of course,
two incompatible sentences can both be approximately true, so that there are
sets of approximately true sentences that are inconsistent and that hence are no
approximately true sets of sentences. In other words, approximate truth is not
preserved under conjunction.
Przełe˛cki’s definition 6 determines approximate truth only for sets of sen-
tences H , which illustrates van Fraassen’s remark that some of his inspirations
were more language-oriented than he liked. But this language-orientation can be
avoided with a slight generalization. It follows from definition 6 that H is ap-
proximately true if and only if a model of H is in M. Since the class E of models
of H is closed under isomorphism, this means that H is approximately true if
and only if some E ∈ E is isomorphic to a structure in M. And this conception
of truth directly generalizes van Fraassen’s conception of truth as isomorphism:
Instead of demanding that some E ∈ E be isomorphic to the one right structure,
one demands that some E ∈ E be isomorphic to one of those structures in M
that approximate the right one:
Definition 7. Let M be an approximation set. A class of structures E is approxi-
mately true in M if and only if for some E ∈ E and some M ∈M, E∼=M.
The connection between Przełe˛cki’s formalism and constructive empiricism
is now given by Przełe˛cki’s treatment of unobservable objects and a generaliza-
tion of his formalism by Przełe˛cki himself. Przełe˛cki (1969, §4) assumes that
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there is a fixed set of objects, some empirically determined to be observable,
some empirically determined to be unobservable, and that all unobservable ob-
jects must be in the in the neutral or non-negative extensions of all terms. In
other words, the approximation set M for the terms of a theory can be deter-
mined by, first, determining the approximation set O over the set of observable
objects, and then including in M all extensions of members of O to all objects.
SinceM is by definition an extension ofO if and only ifM is a substructure ofO,
van Fraassen’s tracing back his use of empirical substructures to Przełe˛cki (1969)
becomes understandable. Since Przełe˛cki assumes a fixed set of objects, however,
his formalism presumes that one has some kind of direct access to unobservable
objects (Przełe˛cki 1974b, 405), which van Fraassen (1989, §3) very much denies.
5 Generalizations
Definition 7 achieves the language independence that van Fraassen demands, and
so Przełe˛cki’s formalism can now be used to generalize empirical adequacy as
long as any assumption about directly accessible unobservable objects is avoided.
This has the immediate advantage of relying only on conceptual assumptions that
van Fraassen could accept, and in fact was inspired by. To be adequate, however,
the generalizations of empirical adequacy to epistemic and approximate empiri-
cal adequacy will have to fulfill some further conditions.
The first condition is that epistemic empirical adequacy indeed has to be a
generalization of empirical adequacy. That is, whenever everything that is pos-
sible to know about the appearances is known, epistemic empirical adequacy
should be equivalent to empirical adequacy. When not everything is known, epis-
temic empirical adequacy should be properly weaker than empirical adequacy.
This condition of adequacy also suggests two more: First, the generalization
should, like definition 3 of empirical adequacy, be metaphysically neutral, while
allowing a strict empiricism. Second, it should not confer a distinguished status
upon human perception, and thus be as neutral with respect to van Fraassen’s
epistemological positions as definition 3.
Further, the example of the interference phenomenon suggests that it is very
fruitful to develop approximate empirical adequacy as a special case of epistemic
empirical adequacy. Specifically, an approximate value of a quantity should be
treated formally as a lack of knowledge about the precise value of the quantity.
In this way, a theory


Tn ,En

that was epistemically empirically adequate given
the resolution of the best measurements can still be valued for its approximate
empirical adequacy, even if upon more precise measurements,


Tn ,En

ceases to
be epistemically empirically adequate. Given the two concepts’ relation, any con-
ditions of adequacy for epistemic empirical adequacy also hold for approximate
empirical adequacy.
For practical purposes, results about the generalizations of empirical ade-
quacy should transfer sensibly from finite to infinite domains. Specifically, the
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Sebastian Lutz Generalizing Empirical Adequacy I—Preprint
generalizations of empirical adequacy for appearances with an infinite domain
should be limiting cases of the generalizations for appearances with a finite do-
main. Otherwise it would, for example, be impossible to infer anything about
surface models from data models, and thus it would specifically be impossible
to argue for the empirical adequacy of a theory for appearances of a continuum
with the help of any finite number of measurements.
5.1 Empirical relativized reducts
In van Fraassen’s definition 1 of a theory, the components of a theory that are
connected to the appearances are given by empirical substructures. This leads to
a variety of problems, since all the terms that occur in the theory also have to
occur in the substructures. The problem suggests the following generalization of
definition 1:
Definition 8. A theory


Tn ,En

contains a family of structures (the models of
the theory) and for each structure Tn =
D
Tn ,P
Tn
i ,F
Tn
j , c
Tn
k
E
i∈In , j∈Jn ,k∈Kn
a set En
of empirical relativized reducts, such that for each E ∈ En , there is a set AE of
terms such that E ⊆ Tn |AE . With each structure, a theory also contains every
isomorphic model and its corresponding empirical substructures.
The reduct Tn |AE of Tn toAE is the structure that differs from Tn only in
that it provides no interpretation of those terms not in AE (Hodges 1993, 9).
This means that every empirical relativized reduct E ∈ En is a relativized reduct
in the sense of model theory.20 Przełe˛cki (1969, ch.5–6) builds much of his formal-
ism on reducts, and Suárez (2005, 38) implicitly uses relativized reducts instead of
substructures in his discussion of empirical adequacy.21 Muller (1997, n. 2) is ex-
plicit about his “non-standard” interpretation of ‘substructure’ as ‘substructure
of a contraction’, where ‘contraction’ means ‘reduct’.22 It is telling that the dis-
cussions of both Suárez and Muller are applications of semantic formalisms to spe-
cific theories, and both authors found the concept of a substructure (which in the
abstract seems very appealing) too confining. With its use of relativized reducts,
definition 8 now solves the problems connected with the use of substructures:
There can be unobservable constants, and functions from values of measurement
results to other mathematical entities, since the constants’ and functions’ sym-
bols may not be in the vocabularyAE.
Although Przełe˛cki uses reducts to capture the received view, the use of rela-
tivized reducts is not a relapse into Carnap’s or Hempel’s conception of a theory,
since the notion of a substructure has not been abandoned. What is more, defi-
nition 8 of a theory contains definition 1 as a special case, namely when for each
20. Hodges (1993, 202–203) defines relativized reducts as those substructures of a reduct that
have the extension of some one place predicate as their domain. I use a slight generalization.
21. Since this again weakens his notion of empirical adequacy, his overall argument remains
unaffected (see n. 11).
22. Of course, Muller does not claim to be using van Fraassen’s notion of empirical adequacy.
20
Sebastian Lutz Generalizing Empirical Adequacy I—Preprint
E ∈ En , AE contains all symbols of Tn , so that Tn |AE = Tn and thus E ⊆ Tn .
Then a theory can be formalized as before.
Furthermore, one could even avoid the use of relativized reducts in the for-
malization of a theory by first treating functions and constants as special kinds of
relations, thereby reformulating the theory to contain only relations. For each
model Tn of the theory, define then a new model T′n with at least one object
t ∈ T ′n−
⋃{E :E ∈ En} such that Tn |AE ⊆T′n |AE and for each mi -ary theoretical
relation RTni , T
′
n contains an mi + 1-ary relation {〈x1, . . . , xmi , t 〉 :〈x1, . . . , xmi 〉 ∈
RTni }. Then for every E ∈ En , the substructure of T′n with domain E differs
from E only by empty relations, so that the empirical relativized reducts of the
original theory can be considered the empirical substructures of the reformu-
lated theory.23 Given the possibility of this reformulation, the use of relativized
reducts cannot in principle be a problem. However, since reformulating theories
exclusively in relation terms needlessly complicates their application (Hodges
1993, 2), and redefining some of these relations to always contain an unobserv-
able object is not a paragon of simplicity either, the use of relativized reducts is
preferable in the following.
Finally, one might object to definition 8 because through its reference to a
set of symbols, it appears much more language dependent than van Fraassen’s
definition 1. This appearance is misleading, as discussed at the beginning of §3:
Depending on the notation, either definition 1 implicitly contains a reference to
a set of symbols, or definition 8 can be reformulated without reference to a set of
symbols, using an index set instead (cf. Lutz 2014b, §3). Muller (1997, n. 2) also
provides a definition of reduct in the standard notation of the semantic view.
5.2 Epistemic empirical adequacy
Generalizing substructures to relativized reducts in the definition of a theory has
solved the problems connected with empirical adequacy’s exclusive reliance on
substructures. Generalizing structures to approximation sets of structures will
solve empirical adequacy’s problems with incomplete knowledge. Indeed, it will
be useful to generalize approximation sets even further and allow any kind of set
of structures, since it is doubtful that every lack of knowledge can be expressed
as an approximation (one may, for instance, be ignorant about the number of
objects in the domain). This generalization allows capturing lack of knowledge
in the following way: A description of an appearance by a single structure is
maximally informative within the conceptual framework of the theory, simply
because the structure of the appearance is completely determined. A description
of an appearance by two structures is less informative, since the appearance could
have either of the two structures. In general, the more structures are used to
describe an appearance, the less information the description provides. Hence it
is possible to express the lack of knowledge about a specific appearance by a set
23. I thank Albert Visser for this point.
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of structures: For all the scientist knows, the actual appearance could have any
of these structures. A singleton set of structures expresses certainty about the
structure of the appearance. Definition 2 thus becomes
Definition 9. Epistemic appearances are given by a set A of sets of structures. A
set Q ∈A is an epistemic appearance.
Note that, like definition 2, definition 9 allows the complete lack of knowl-
edge about some appearances: The set A may, for instance, contain only a single
set of structures, even though there are many more appearances that could be
described, however imprecisely.
Definition 7 of approximate truth can now also be generalized: A class of
structures E is then epistemically true in Q, that is, true to the extent of one’s
knowledge, if for some E ∈ E and some A ∈Q, E∼=A. Informally, the empirical
adequacy of a theory is the truth of the theory’s claims about the phenomena.
The pertinent generalization in this case would be that the theory’s claims about
the phenomena are epistemically true. Since what a theory claims about the
phenomena is given by its empirical substructures, this leads directly to
Definition 10. Given the epistemic appearances A, a theory


Tn ,En

is epistem-
ically empirically adequate for A if and only if there is some n ∈ N such that for
every Q ∈A, there are an A ∈Q and an E ∈ En with E∼=A.
As noted, definition 3 expresses empirical adequacy if and only if A is as-
sumed to contain all appearances, and in this sense, it already allows for a modi-
fied notion of empirical adequacy that takes a specific kind of lack of knowledge
into account: Some appearances may simply not be described at all. Definition 10
adds a new kind of lack of knowledge, since even those appearances that are de-
scribed may still be described incompletely.
Example. It is now possible to investigate under what circumstances the ray
theory of light is epistemically empirically adequate given the interference phe-
nomenon. Let the measurement set-up be such that the scientist’s eyes have the
effective spatial resolution p > pmin and intensity resolution q > qmin. If the
intensity pattern is measured, giving a finite set of pairs of valuesnD
x1,ψ
q
p (x1)
E
, . . . ,
D
xs ,ψ
q
p (xs )
Eo
, (18)
then the effective resolutions of the scientist’s eyes restrict the possible actual
values of the appearance ψ
qmin
pmin
. The measurements thus result in the set
R,ϕ :ϕ ∈Φ	 (19)
of structures, where all functions ϕ ∈Φ have to be such that
ϕ :R−→ ℘R≥0, x 7→ hχ (x)− qmin
2
,χ (x)+
qmin
2
i
∩R≥0 (20)
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for some χ : R −→ R and ϕ(xi ) ⊆ ψ
q
p (xi ) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ s . One of these
functions then is the actual graph ψ
qmin
pmin
of the intensity, but for all the scientist
knows, it could be any of them. Note that the epistemic appearances are already
given as a set of structures with infinite domains, thereby avoiding the cardinality
objection from the start.
For the ray theory to be epistemically empirically adequate, the mea-
sured intensity ranges ψ
q
p (xi ) must be supersets of the ranges ψ
rayqmin
pmin
(xi ) =
[I − qmin/2, I + qmin/2]∩R≥0. This is the case if ψp never deviates from ψray pmin
more than (q − qmin)/2. In terms of the deviation factor (9), this means that
2I |D(p/λ)| ≤ q−qmin for all λ (since in this case p is assumed fixed). Since D(x)
is enclosed between ±1/(2pix), this is always the case if λI ≤pi p(q− qmin).24 ?
The connection between epistemic empirical adequacy and empirical ade-
quacy can be formulated with the help of
Definition 11. Given epistemic appearances A, A′ are epistemically possible ap-
pearances if and only if A′ = {e(Q) :Q ∈ A}, where e is any function from A to⋃
A with e(Q) ∈Q.
e is a choice function, picking out one element A= e(Q) from each Q. This
is the formal expression of the idea that for each set of structures describing a
single appearance, each of the structures could be the correct description of the
appearance. A theory


Tn ,En

is then epistemically empirically adequate for
epistemic appearances A if and only if there are epistemically possible appear-
ances A′ such that


Tn ,En

is empirically adequate for A′ (claim 3). Thus the
epistemic appearances can indeed be considered the set of epistemically possible
appearances.
It is now possible to show that the conception of epistemic adequacy sug-
gested here fulfills the conditions of adequacy. For one, whenever the appear-
ances are completely known (without any uncertainty as expressed by a mul-
tiplicity of structures), epistemic empirical adequacy is equivalent to empirical
adequacy. More precisely, if A are the appearances and A′ = {{A} :A ∈ A} are
epistemic appearances, then


Tn ,En

is empirically adequate for A if and only if

Tn ,En

is epistemically empirically adequate forA′ (claim 4). Thus, as required,
definition 10 generalizes van Fraassen’s definition 3 of empirical adequacy.
Definitions 9 and 10 rely only on concepts that are defined both for finite
and infinite domains, and that are known to behave well in the transition from
one to the other. Since furthermore the definitions themselves do not refer to
the cardinality of the domains, it can be expected that they, too, behave well
in the transition from finite to infinite domains. The definitions also do not
add any metaphysical assumptions. The only additional assumption, that lack of
knowledge can be represented as multiplicity, is epistemic. Finally, nothing in
24. This holds for p/λ < 1/(2pi) (see n. 3).
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definitions 9 and 10 requires that the appearances describe direct observations.
They could also be determined through measurements that are, for the purposes
at hand, treated as uncontroversial.25
5.3 Approximate empirical adequacy
As demanded by the conditions of adequacy, one can now define approximation
as a special case of lack of knowledge:
Definition 12. Approximate appearances are given by epistemic appearances A
where each Q ∈A is an approximation set.
Accordingly, approximate empirical adequacy is a special case of epistemic
empirical adequacy:
Definition 13. A theory


Tn ,En

is approximately empirically adequate for ap-
proximate appearances A if and only if


Tn ,En

is epistemically empirically ad-
equate for A.
It follows from definitions 10 and 13 that


Tn ,En

is approximately empir-
ically adequate given A if and only if there is an n ∈ N such that for every
approximate appearance Q ∈A there is an empirical substructure E ∈ En that is
isomorphic to some member of Q. Definition 13 thus provides an explication of
van Fraassen’s unexplicated notion of “approximate embedding” (van Fraassen
1989, 366, n. 5).26 Given definition 7, one can also say that a theory is approxi-
mately empirically adequate if and only if what it says about the phenomena is
approximately true.
Since singleton sets of structures are approximation sets, and since by claim 4
epistemic empirical adequacy given singleton epistemic appearances corresponds
to empirical adequacy, it follows that definition 13 generalizes van Fraassen’s def-
inition 3 of empirical adequacy. In general, the connection between approximate
empirical adequacy and empirical adequacy is the same as that between epistemic
empirical adequacy and empirical adequacy (and thus given by definition 11 and
claim 3).
Example. The interference phenomenon can be treated in terms of approximate
empirical adequacy as well. Indeed, the conditions (20) of the epistemic appear-
ance (19) are already such that the epistemic appearance is an approximation set.
For the non-negative extension of the function ϕ is given by
ϕ+◦ =
nD
xi ,
h
yi −
qmin
2
, yi +
qmin
2
i
∩R≥0
E
:h
yi −
qmin
2
, yi +
qmin
2
i
∩R≥0 ⊆ψqp (xi ), 1≤ i ≤ s
o
. (21)
25. The generalization even allows treating a non-blurred interference pattern as appearance, and
the blurred interference pattern as an epistemic appearance. Of course, this would go against the
distinguished status that constructive empiricism confers upon human perception.
26. Although I would call it ‘approximate empirical embedding’.
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Hence, for the ray theory to be approximately empirically adequate, the mea-
sured intensity ranges must again be supersets of [I − qmin/2, I + qmin/2]∩R≥0.
However, even if at some point p = pmin and q = qmin, the ray theory can
still be approximately true in the sense that, for some resolutions p0 and q0,
ψray
qmin
pmin
always stays within the range of the blurred intensity ψ
q0
p0
. Thus the ray
theory stays approximately empirically adequate. If one assumes pmin = 0 (or
rather: if one takes the convolution function to be a delta distribution, b (x) =
δ(x)) and further assumes qmin = 0, one has effectively eliminated the auxiliary
theory about the scientist’s eyes from the preceding analysis. The analysis then
only pertains to ψrayand ψ, and that ψray(x) ∈ ψq0p0(x) expresses simply that the
ray theory approximates the wave theory, in the specific contextual sense of ‘ap-
proximation’ given by ψ
q0
p0
. Note that contrary to claims in some discussions of
the relation between wave and ray theory of light (e. g., Batterman 2002, §6.2),
there is no need to take any singular limits into account for this result. ?
5.4 Hierarchies of empirical adequacy
With epistemic and approximate empirical adequacy defined relative to epistemic
and approximate appearances, one can now formalize the development of the
appearances, specifically, the increase of knowledge about the phenomena. To
this effect, I suggest
Definition 14. A hierarchy of epistemic appearances 〈{Al }l∈L,C 〉 contains an in-
dexed set {Al }l∈L of epistemic appearances with an ordered index set L and a set
C containing for any Al ,Am , l ,m ∈ L, l ≤ m exactly one injection b : Al −→
Am such that for all Q ∈Al , b (Q)⊆Q.
Additionally, for any three injections b , c ,d ∈ C with b : Al −→ Am , c :
Am −→An , and d :Al −→An , d = c ◦ b .
To see the point of the definition, consider for now only the first part. A
hierarchy of epistemic appearances allows the growth of knowledge in two re-
spects. First, since each b ∈C only has to be an injection, Am can contain more
epistemic appearances than Al . Hence an epistemic hierarchy can describe the
accumulation of measurements of new phenomena. Second, since b (Q) ⊆ Q,
the knowledge about specific appearances can grow as well, for the number of
epistemically possible appearances can decrease. In this way, definition 14 cap-
tures the gain of knowledge from one level of the hierarchy to the next, or better,
since the index set L does not have to be countable, the gain of knowledge going
from one level in the hierarchy (as indicated by l ∈ L) to any higher level.27
27. I thank Leszek Wron´ski for the suggestion to allow infinitely many levels. Note that the kind
of hierarchy described here is very different from the hierarchy of structures described by Suppes
(1962), which at least prima facie does not describe an increase in empirical information, but rather
a successive change of structures given the same information.
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Because of the additional condition, C determines for any appearance at any
level in the hierarchy a unique line of ancestors and descendants. The effect of the
condition is that it does not matter whether one makes first a step fromAl toAm
and then a step from Am to An or directly one bigger step from Al to An . For
the analysis of one’s improvement of the appearances, this means that not every
intermediate step in the improvement has to be explicitly included in one’s anal-
ysis. The set C also fulfills a second function: It determines which appearances at
a level are improvements of which appearances at lower levels. Specifically, this
means that C determines which appearances from different levels describe the
same phenomenon.28
Example. In the interference phenomenon, the measurement results (18) lead to
the epistemic appearance (20), which is determined by the spatial resolution p
and the intensity resolution q . For intensity resolutions q ′ ≤ q , the epistemic
appearance is a subset of that for q , so that an increase in resolution (i. e., a de-
crease of q ) leads naturally to a hierarchy of epistemic appearances. A decrease
of p does not lead to such a hierarchy. Rather, changing p leads to different hier-
archies, each depending on q : For p = nλ/2 and for p→∞, the deviation factor
D(p/λ) = 0, so that ψ
q
p = ψ
rayqmin
pmin
= [I − q/2, I + q/2] ∩R≥0. Other values
0≤ p < λ lead to sinusoidal patterns. ?
A theory that is found out not to be epistemically empirically adequate at
some point should not become epistemically empirically adequate when the
knowledge about the phenomena increases, and vice versa, a theory epistemi-
cally empirically adequate at one point should also be epistemically empirically
adequate when less is known about the phenomena. This is the case for hierar-
chies of epistemic appearances (claim 5).
As a special case of definition 14, there is
Definition 15. A restricted hierarchy of epistemic appearances is a hierarchy of
epistemic appearance in which the injections between epistemic appearances are
bijections.
A restricted hierarchy captures the idea that the increase of knowledge may
be restricted to describing specific phenomena more precisely, rather than con-
sidering new phenomena. A restricted hierarchy provides a much tighter control
over the appearances. This will become clear below.
Relative to a hierarchy of epistemic appearances, it is now possible to de-
fine what it means for one theory to be more epistemically empirically adequate
28. Note that one could also express successive improvements in the precision of measurements
through measuring devices in terms of hierarchies of epistemic appearances. Of course, this would
again go against the distinguished status that constructive empiricism confers upon human percep-
tion.
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than another. As the discussion of definition 2 has made clear, such a compari-
son based on appearances is only possible between theories that have the same
conceptual framework.29
Definition 16. Given a (restricted) hierarchy of epistemic appearances 〈{Al }l∈L,
C 〉, theory 
Tn ,En is at least as (restrictedly) epistemically empirically adequate for〈{Al }l∈L,C 〉 as theory 〈Ts ,Es 〉 if and only if for any l ∈ L it holds that 〈Ts ,Es 〉
is epistemically empirically adequate for Al only if


Tn ,En

is epistemically em-
pirically adequate for Al .
Since an epistemically empirically inadequate theory can never become epis-
temically empirically adequate by an increase in knowledge about the appear-
ances (claim 5), definition 16 entails that if theory


Tn ,En

is at least as epistem-
ically empirically adequate as theory 〈Ts ,Es 〉 and


Tn ,En

ceases to be empiri-
cally adequate due to knowledge gain, so does 〈Ts ,Es 〉.
The definition of a hierarchy for approximations and the corresponding defi-
nition of comparative approximate empirical adequacy are straightforward:
Definition 17. A (restricted) hierarchy of approximate appearances is a (restricted)
hierarchy of epistemic appearances in which all members are approximation sets.
Definition 18. Given a (restricted) hierarchy of approximate appearances
〈{Al }l∈L,C 〉, theory


Tn ,En

is at least as (restrictedly) approximately empirically
adequate for 〈{Al }l∈L,C 〉 as theory 〈Ts ,Es 〉 if and only if


Tn ,En

is at least
as (restrictedly) epistemically empirically adequate for 〈{Al }l∈L,C 〉 as theory〈Ts ,Es 〉.
The hierarchies of epistemic and approximate appearances allow for specific
routes of the increase of knowledge about the phenomena, that is, different series
of experiments will lead to different hierarchies. In principle the formalism does
not even need to track any real or imagined series of experiments. It just has
to track some kind of improvement. Since the comparative notions of approx-
imate empirical adequacy are defined via hierarchies, the formalism suggested
here can therefore capture in a very general way the idea that the quality of an
approximation can depend on the context (which can determine the approximate
hierarchies). This conception of comparative approximation does not render the
concept completely arbitrary or exclusively dependent on the context, however.
In a (restricted) hierarchy of approximate appearances, the terms at each level of
the hierarchy are better approximations (that is, are more precisely determined)
than the terms at any lower level of the hierarchy (claim 6). The approximate
hierarchy only determines how this increase in precision develops.
Example. Since in the interference phenomenon the epistemic appearance (19)
already forms an approximation set, lowering q leads not only to a hierarchy
29. In definitions and claims here and in the following, texts in brackets has to be either system-
atically included or omitted, thus leading to two different definitions and claims.
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of epistemic, but also of approximate appearances, which again is non-trivial
for p 6= nλ/2,∞. And the hierarchy of approximate appearances resulting from
lowering q renders the wave theory of light at least as approximately empirically
adequate as the ray theory of light. Again, the lowering of p does not lead to an
approximate hierarchy. ?
According to claims 3 and 5, a theory that at one level in the hierarchy is
not epistemically empirically adequate is not empirically adequate. But it is also
of interest at which point of a hierarchy one can be sure that a theory is empir-
ically adequate. Given the possibility that a new phenomenon renders a theory
empirically inadequate, such a claim has to be restricted to restricted hierarchies.
Roughly, once one has reached a level in a restricted hierarchy of epistemic or ap-
proximate appearances at which a theory is empirically adequate for all epistem-
ically possible appearances, it will remain epistemically empirically adequate or,
respectively, approximately empirically adequate under any further information
gain. More precisely,


Tn ,En

is epistemically or approximately empirically ade-
quate at all points of all restricted hierarchies of epistemic or, respectively, approx-
imate appearances with the initial indexed set {Al }l≤m if and only if


Tn ,En

is
empirically adequate for all appearances that are epistemically possible given Am
(claim 7).
One may think that all these new concepts have taken the discussion far from
van Fraassen’s intentions, even if his formalism was modified only minimally and
in line with one of his inspirations. But this is not so, for even the notion of epis-
temic hierarchies connects almost directly to one of van Fraassen’s concepts. To
see this, note first that one can compare the epistemic empirical adequacy of the-
ories independently of specific hierarchies of epistemic appearances. Specifically,

Tn ,En

is at least as (restrictedly) epistemically empirically adequate as 〈Ts ,Es 〉
for any (restricted) hierarchy of epistemic appearances if and only if


Tn ,En

is
empirically adequate for all appearances A for which 〈Ts ,Es 〉 is empirically ade-
quate (claim 8). The universal generalization loses all the information that comes
from specific hierarchies, that is, specific ways in which information about the
phenomena is gained.
This coarse-graining now connects the preceding discussion directly with a
definition by van Fraassen (1980, 67), who states: “If for every model M of T
there is a model M ′ of T ′ such that all empirical substructures of M are isomor-
phic to empirical substructures of M ′, then T is empirically at least as strong as
T ′”. It now holds that for two theories


Tn ,En

and 〈Ts ,Es 〉, there is for every
n ∈ N an s ∈ S such that all empirical substructures in En are isomorphic to
empirical substructures in Es if and only if 〈Ts ,Es 〉 is empirically adequate for
all appearances A for which


Tn ,En

is empirically adequate (claim 9). Thus,
by claims 7 and 9, if


Tn ,En

is at least as (restrictedly) epistemically adequate
as 〈Ts ,Es 〉 for any (restricted) hierarchy of epistemic appearances, then 〈Ts ,Es 〉
is empirically at least as strong as


Tn ,En

. This result connects the concepts
newly introduced in this article directly with van Fraassen’s comparative notion
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of empirical strength.
The result also points to a weakness of van Fraassen’s notion: Most theories
will be incomparable in their empirical strength. As in the case of comparative
epistemic or approximate empirical adequacy, two theories are incomparable if
their or their auxiliary theories’ conceptual frameworks differ. But furthermore,
even if the two theories’ appearances are given within the same framework, it
will often happen that for each theory, there are structures that can be empiri-
cally embedded in one theory but not the other, so that the theories have incom-
parable empirical strength. In this respect, there is an analogy between empirical
adequacy and empirical strength: Both are helpful concepts, but both are also
too crude to capture many aspects of scientific research.
6 Conclusion
The use of approximation sets allows generalizations of empirical adequacy to in-
corporate lack of knowledge and approximation. That the generalizations allow
an analysis of the example of the interference pattern shows that the generaliza-
tions are applicable to imprecise measurements. That the generalizations further
allow a simple analysis of the growth of scientific knowledge and connect di-
rectly to van Fraassen’s concept of empirical strength show that they are fruitful
for research in the philosophy of science.
If the generalizations seem more complicated than one would expect from
previous generalizations, this impression may result from the reliance of pre-
vious generalizations on idiosyncratic empirical adequacy (definition 4), which
can lead to simplifications. Some generalizations also leave the possibility of mul-
tiple empirical substructures and appearances implicit (cf. Bueno 1997), which
also simplifies matters considerably. If, on the other hand, the generalizations
still seem too simplistic, especially in that they do not explicitly take statistical
methods into account, this impression is correct. The concepts suggested here are
first steps towards even more general relations between theories and appearances.
A Proofs
Claim 1. For some appearances A, some theories are idiosyncratically empirically
adequate but not empirically adequate.
Proof. Let the appearances be given by the set of the two structures {〈{1,2},
{1,2}〉, 〈{3,4},{3}〉}. Let the theory be given by the family with members T1 =〈{0,1,2,},{0,1,2}〉 and T2 = 〈{3,4,5},{3}〉 as well as the singleton sets of em-
pirical substructures E1 = {〈{1,2},{1,2}〉} and E2 = {〈{3,4},{3}〉}. Let all other
models of the theory be isomorphic to T1 or T2 and have the corresponding em-
pirical substructures. Then the theory is idiosyncratically empirically adequate
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by virtue of the identity mapping on each of the appearances’ domains, but it is
not empirically adequate.
Claim 2. For some appearances A and theory


Tn ,En

,


Tn ,En

is empirically
adequate given A, but


Tn ,En

has no model such that all appearances in A are
empirical substructures of that model.
Proof. Let the appearances be given by the set of the two structures {〈{a, b},
{a, b}〉, 〈{c ,d},{c}〉}, where a, b , c , and d are distinct objects. Let the theory be
given by the family with the member T1 = 〈{1,2,3},{1,2}〉 and the set of empir-
ical substructures E1 = {〈{1,2},{1,2}〉, 〈{2,3},{2}〉}. Let all other models of the
theory be isomorphic to T1 and have the corresponding empirical substructures.
Then the theory is empirically adequate, but every bijection from {1,2,3}—and
thus every isomorphism for T1—maps 2, the object shared by the empirical sub-
structures, to a single object. Since the domains of the appearances do not share
an element, the appearances therefore can never be empirical substructures of
the same model of the theory.
Claim 3. A theory


Tn ,En

is epistemically empirically adequate for epistemic ap-
pearances A if and only if there are epistemically possible appearances A′ such that

Tn ,En

is empirically adequate for A′.
Proof. ‘⇒’: 
Tn ,En is epistemically empirically adequate for A if and only if
there is some n ∈ N such that for every Q ∈ A, there are A ∈ Q and E ∈ En
with E∼=A. For each Q, choose e(Q) = A. Then there is some n ∈ N such that
for every A ∈A′, there is an E ∈ En with E∼=A, so that


Tn ,En

is empirically
adequate for A′.
‘⇐’: Similar.
Claim 4. Let A be appearances, and A′ = {{A} :A ∈ A} be epistemic appearances.
Then


Tn ,En

is empirically adequate for A if and only if


Tn ,En

is epistemically
empirically adequate for A′.
Proof. Given the epistemic appearances A′ = {{A} :A ∈ A}, the only epistemi-
cally possible appearances are given byA. Claim 4 now follows from claim 3.
Claim 5. Let 〈{Al }l∈L,C 〉 be a hierarchy of epistemic appearances. If theory

Tn ,En

is epistemically empirically adequate for Al , l ∈ L, then


Tn ,En

is epis-
temically empirically adequate for any Ak ,k ∈ L,k ≤ l . If theory


Tn ,En

is not
epistemically empirically adequate for Al , l ∈ L, then


Tn ,En

is not epistemically
empirically adequate for any Am ,m ∈ L,m ≥ l .
Proof. By definition 14, for any k ≤ l and any Q ∈ Ak , there is a b such that
b (Q) ∈ Al and b (Q) ⊆ Q. Thus, if


Tn ,En

is epistemically empirically ad-
equate for Al , there is some n ∈ N such that for every Q ∈ Ak , there are a
A ∈ b (Q) ⊆ Q and an E ∈ En with E ∼= A. The proof of the claim’s second
conjunct is similar.
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Claim 6. 〈{Al }l∈L,C 〉 is a (restricted) hierarchy of approximate appearances
if and only if the following holds: For any l ≤ m with l ,m ∈ L, there is
an injection (bijection) b : Al −→ Am in C such that for all Q ∈ Al with
{R+i ,R−i ,F +◦j , c+◦k }i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K and for b (Q) ∈Am with {R˜+i , R˜−i , F˜ +◦j , c˜+◦k }i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K
it holds that R+i ⊆ R˜+i , R−i ⊆ R˜−i , F˜ +◦j ⊆ F +◦j , and c˜+◦j ⊆ c+◦j for all i ∈ I , j ∈
J ,k ∈K .
Proof. ‘⇒’: By definition 14, there is an injection (bijection) b :Al −→Am in C
such that for all Q, b (Q)⊆Q. The claim follows from (14)–(17).
‘⇐’: Immediate.
Claim 7.


Tn ,En

is epistemically/approximately empirically adequate at all points
of all restricted hierarchies of epistemic/approximate appearances with the initial se-
quence 〈Al 〉l≤m if and only if


Tn ,En

is empirically adequate for all appearances
that are epistemically possible given Am .
Proof. ‘⇒’: Assume 
Tn ,En is restrictedly epistemically/approximately ade-
quate at all points of all hierarchies of epistemic appearances with the initial
sequence 〈Al 〉l≤m . For all appearances A that are epistemically possible given
Al , the sequence 〈Am ,A′〉l≤m with A′ = {{A} :A ∈ A} as its last element is a
hierarchy of epistemic/approximate appearances. Therefore


Tn ,En

is epistem-
ically empirically adequate for A′, and thus, by claim 4,


Tn ,En

is empirically
adequate for A.
‘⇐’: For any point Ar of any hierarchy with initial sequence 〈Al 〉l≤m , there
is a bijection b :Am −→Ar in C with b (Q)⊆Q. By assumption, there is there-
fore a function e from Ar to
⋃
Ar with e(Q) ∈Q⊆ b−1(Q) such that


Tn ,En

is empirically adequate for {e(Q) :Q ∈ Ar }. Since {e(Q) :Q ∈ Ar } is epistem-
ically possible given Ar , by claim 3,


Tn ,En

is epistemically/approximately
empirically adequate for Ar .
Claim 8.


Tn ,En

is at least as (restrictedly) epistemically empirically adequate as
〈Ts ,Es 〉 for any (restricted) hierarchy of epistemic appearances if and only if


Tn ,En

is empirically adequate for all appearances A for which 〈Ts ,Es 〉 is empirically ade-
quate.
Proof. ‘⇒’: Choose the trivial (restricted) hierarchy of epistemic appearances
〈A〉 with A containing all appearances for which 〈Ts ,Es 〉 is empirically adequate.
Then all these appearances are epistemically possible appearances given A, and
by claim 3, the claim follows.
‘⇐’: Immediate from the definitions and claim 3.
Claim 9. 〈Ts ,Es 〉 is empirically adequate for all appearances A for which


Tn ,En

is empirically adequate if and only if for every n ∈ N , there is an s ∈ S such that all
empirical substructures of Tn are isomorphic to empirical substructures of Ts .
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Proof. ‘⇒’: For each En , choose A= En . Then


Tn ,En

is empirically adequate
for A, and thus 〈Ts ,Es 〉 is empirically adequate for A. Therefore for every E ∈
En =A there is an s ∈ S and an E′ ∈ Es such that E∼=E′.
‘⇐’: Assume that for some A, 〈Ts ,Es 〉 but not


Tn ,En

is empirically ade-
quate. Then there is an s ∈ S such that for all A ∈ A, there is an E′ ∈ Es with
A∼= E′. Since there is no such n ∈N and the isomorphism relation is transitive,
there is no n such that for all E′ ∈ Es , there is an E ∈ En with E′ ∼=E.
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